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Abstract
Initially rent asunder by the fortunes of the Second World War, the division of North and
South Korea into two separate countries was solidified by the Korean War. North of the 38th
parallel, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (”DPRK”) became a totalitarian dictatorship
based on a command economy. South of the 38th parallel, the Republic of Korea evolved into a
liberal democracy with a market economy. For much of the last fifty years, these arrangements
seemedto be almost as unchangeable and enduring as the Cold War itself. Yet, the disintegration
of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent elimination of the rivalry between East and West, strongly
suggest that the survival of the communist regime in the North can no longer be taken for granted.
Similarly, just as the collapse of communism in East Germany was a necessary condition for the
reunification of the two Germanys, the demise of communism in North Korea must now be consid-
ered a prerequisite for the reunification of the Korean peninsula. Indeed, if the precise date for the
collapse of communism in North Korea cannot be predicted, the terminal status of the regime in
Pyongyang can now be assumed. Whether it takes place next year, or in the next century, the days
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are numbered. Yet, if the eventual disintegration of
communism in North Korea is certain, the manner of its demise remains uncertain. Based on what
happened in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the Communist world, there are a variety of ways
in which the polity in Pyongyang might presumably be undone. An examination of these differing
scenarios may shed light on how change in North Korea is likely to come about.
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If there is any law of international relations it must surely be
that the only thing that is truly predictable is the unpredictable.
For most of the last half-century, the Cold War and the existence
of totalitarian communist regimes seemed to be an immutable
political reality. So, too, did the division of Germany, which ap-
peared to be the inescapable consequence of the division of Eu-
rope into two hostile and ideologically incompatible camps.
Few anticipated the possibility that the whole edifice of Eu-
ropean communism would come crashing down, with barely a
shot being fired and that, without exception, all of the Socialist
regimes of Central and Eastern Europe would move toward the
establishment of parliamentary democracies and market eco-
nomics. Hardly anyone expected that Germany, which had been
torn asunder as a consequence of war, would quickly be reunited
in the context of peace.
These developments have important implications for the fu-
ture of the two Koreas. Initially rent asunder by the fortunes of
the Second World War, the division of North and South Korea
into two separate countries was solidified by the Korean War.
North of the 38th parallel, the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea ("DPRK") became a totalitarian dictatorship based on a
command economy. South of the 38th parallel, the Republic of
Korea evolved into a liberal democracy with a market economy.
For much of the last fifty years, these arrangements seemed
to be almost as unchangeable and enduring as the Cold War it-
self. Yet, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the subse-
quent elimination of the rivalry between East and West, strongly
suggest that the survival of the communist regime in the North
can no longer be taken for granted. Similarly, just as the col-
lapse of communism in East Germany was a necessary condition
for the reunification of the two Germanys, the demise of com-
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munism in North Korea must now be considered a prerequisite
for the reunification of the Korean peninsula.
Indeed, if the precise date for the collapse of communism
in North Korea cannot be predicted, the terminal status of the
regime in Pyongyang can now be assumed. Whether it takes
place next year, or in the next century, the days of the Demo-
cratic People's Republic of Korea are numbered. Yet, if the
eventual disintegration of communism in North Korea is certain,
the manner of its demise remains uncertain.
Based on what happened in the Soviet Union and elsewhere
in the Communist world, there are a variety of ways in which the
polity in Pyongyang might presumably be undone. An examina-
tion of these differing scenarios may shed light on how change
in North Korea is likely to come about.
1. The Soviet Scenario
When Mikhail Gorbachev' initiated his reform programs of
"glasnost" and "perestroika" in the mid-1980's, his intention was
not to destroy the Soviet Union but to strengthen it. Recogniz-
ing that the USSR was falling behind the West economically,
Gorbachev concluded that structural reforms in the economic
and political system were necessary if the Soviet Union was to
remain a great power. In the process, however, forces were un-
leashed that generated momentum for even greater and far
more fundamental change.
When a cabal of old line leaders, in a last ditch effort to
preserve the shards of their own power and the centralized char-
acter of the Soviet system, failed to remove Gorbachev through a
military coup, the system lost what little legitimacy it still had. It
wasn't long before the Communist party was abolished and the
Soviet Union was replaced by the Commonwealth of Independ-
ent States.
2. The East German Scenario
Following the collapse of Communism in Poland and Hun-
gary, tens of thousands of East Germans began to flee the Ger-
1. Serge Schmemann, TheFall of Gorbachev, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1991, at 1. Mikhail
Gorbachev was leader of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("USSR") from 1985
until 1991. Id.
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man Democratic Republic' ("GDR") through Hungary, which
no longer maintained an Iron Curtain preventing people from
going to the West. In an effort to staunch the flow, the
Politburo, under the leadership of Erich Honecker,3 issued a de-
cree prohibiting East Germans from leaving the country. This
led to a series of sustained demonstrations in which hundreds of
thousands of East Germans took to the streets to call for funda-
mental political and social change.
Without the support of the Soviet leadership, which felt it
could not oppose a movement for reform in the GDR when it
was promoting a process of reform in the USSR, the regime felt
obligated to give in to the demands for change. Honecker was
removed and the Berlin Wall was torn down. Since, however,
everyone in East Germany was now free to leave, and the system
of one party rule had been totally discredited, the ideological
and political justification for the division of Germany no longer
existed. It wasn't long before what had previously seemed im-
possible became inevitable and Germany was formally reunited.
3. The Romanian Scenario
In the wake of the collapse of communism elsewhere in
Eastern Europe, the Romanian people were becoming restive as
a result of draconian political restrictions and a precipitous de-
cline in the economy. Without fuel to heat their homes in win-
ter and with barely enough food to meet minimal nutritional
requirements Romania had become a tinder box of political re-
sentments waiting for a spark to set off a massive conflagration.
The spark came when the dictator, Nicolae Ceaucescu,4 was
booed at a public rally he had called to demonstrate support for
his regime. Unaccustomed to open displays of disaffection at
gatherings of the party faithful, Ceaucescu panicked and fled the
podium. Carried live on Romanian television, this bizarre epi-
sode led the Romanian people to realize that the regime might
be vulnerable. It immediately led to a spontaneous series of
2. THE CONCISE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 328 (1983) The German Democratic Re-
public was informally referred to as East Germany. Id.
3. David Childs, Erich Honecker, INDEPENDENT, May 30, 1994, at Gazette Page 10.
'Erich Honecker was a member of the Poltiburo between 1958 and 1989, and was Chair-
man between 1976 and 1989. Id.
4. Mary Ellen Fischer, Rumania: Up For Grabs, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 28, 1989, at A21.
Nicolae Ceaucescu was President of Romania from 1965 until 1989. Id.
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demonstrations, which the internal security forces tried but were
unable to crush. When the military decided to back the people
rather than the regime it was only a matter of days before the
security forces were overwhelmed, and Romania joined the
growing list of East European countries that had abandoned one
party rule and a command economy for a multi-party democracy
and a market economy.
4. The Polish Scenario
Poland's process of change began in 1980 with the establish-
ment of an independent labor union known as Solidarity. In a
matter of months the union had millions of members and began
to issue a series of political and economic demands that the Po-
lish authorities were unwilling to meet. Backed by what at that
time was still a resolute Soviet regime, President Jaruzelski5 de-
cided to crack down by establishing martial law and abolishing
Solidarity.
While this desperate maneuver succeeded in temporarily
eliminating the growing challenge to the regime, it eventually
became clear that without the support of Solidarity, it would not
be possible for the government to make the economic reforms
necessary to rescue the Polish economy from terminal decay. By
1988, the Government concluded that it had no alternative but
to enter into "round table" negotiations with the leadership of
Solidarity and other independent elements of civil society in an
effort to hammer out an agreement that would permit meaning-
ful reform.
The price demanded by Solidarity and its non-communist
negotiating partners was fundamental political reform, includ-
ing the holding of free and fair multi-party elections. When the
government agreed to these demands, it set the stage for the
peaceful unraveling of Communist power in Poland. Candidates
endorsed by Solidarity won the subsequent parliamentary elec-
tions in a landslide, and the Polish Communist party was swept
into the dust bin of history.
5. Michael T. Kaufman, The Importance of General Jaruzelski, N.Y. TIMS, Dec. 9,
1984, at 46. General Wojciech Jaruzelski, political and military leader of Poland, be-
came premier and leader of the Polish Communist Party in 1981. Id. GeneralJaruzel-
ski ruled Poland until 1989. John Darnton, Poland Revifited, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 17, 1993,
at Al.
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5. The Mongolian Scenario
As the fiscal plight of the Soviet Union began to worsen, its
aid to Mongolia was sharply reduced. Since various forms of
assistance from the USSR accounted for 50% of the Mongolian
GNP, this created something of a crisis in Ulan Bator. Seeing
what was happening in both the USSR and the Socialist coun-
tries of Eastern and Central Europe, the leadership of the
Mongolian Communist party concluded that the best way to
maintain their independence was to appeal to the West by estab-
lishing a parliamentary democracy and a market economy. So it
was that the first Communist Government in Asia withered away.
In assessing the applicability of these various scenarios for
North Korea, it seems fairly clear that the East German and Po-
lish scenarios are exceedingly unlikely to constitute the basis for
the collapse of Communism in the DPRK Compared to North
Korea, the most closed and repressive regime in the world, East
Germany and Poland were virtually open societies. Their people
had access to information from abroad. Each had far more so-
cial and economic contact with the outside world. In both coun-
tries, Christian churches provided some- basis for independent
political activity. In North Korea, by comparison, people have
no way of obtaining news from abroad, and the only permitted
religion, if religion is what it can be called, is the worship of the
Kim dynasty.
For all these reasons it is extremely unlikely that the kind of
peaceful but public demands that were the proximate cause of
the collapse of communism in East Germany and Poland will de-
velop in North Korea. Even if such a movement began to
emerge in North Korea, it is inconceivable that the regime in
Pyongyang would permit the kind of sustained demonstrations
that eventually brought down the government in East Germany.
Furthermore, there is nothing like the Solidarity movement in
Poland with which the North Korean Government might enter
into negotiations, even if it were inclined to do so, which it
clearly isn't.
The Mongolian scenario is equally, if not even more, un-
likely. A similar development in North Korea, in which Pyong-
yang transformed itself overnight into a parliamentary democ-
racy with a market economy, would completely eliminate any ra-
tionale for its continued existence as a separate state and, far
1995]
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from assuring its independence, would guarantee its absorption
by South Korea. Unless the North Korean leadership is pre-
pared to voluntarily commit political suicide this is a course of
action they cannot be expected to take.
The Romanian scenario, while not likely, cannot be entirely
ruled out. Like Romania in the late 1980's, North Korea in the
mid-1990's is in the midst of a severe economic decline. There
are credible reports that the people do not have enough to eat.
Dissatisfaction is presumably rampant. Under these circum
stances, spontaneous expressions of discontent are entirely possi-
ble.
Given Pyongyang's control of the mass media, however, it is
doubtful that news of an anti-government demonstration in one
village or city would become known throughout the country, and
the stimulus for supportive action elsewhere would thus be de-
nied. Protests could, of course, erupt in the capital. But even if
they did, the chances are that the North Korean military, who
are the true arbiters of national power, would side with the re-
gime rather than the people and any incipient revolt would be
ruthlessly and completely crushed.
The most likely scenario for change in North Korea is the
Soviet scenario, in which an effort to promote economic and
perhaps even political reform generates a momentum of its own,
leading to the eventual unraveling of the regime. Given the dire
economic circumstances in which North Korea finds itself, a fail-
ure to initiate fundamental reforms could easily result in a
Romanian style upheaval by a resentful population that con-
cludes it no longer has anything to lose. So long as Kim Jong II
remains the presumptive ruler of North Korea, however, such a
reform program must be considered unlikely. The "Dear
Leader" derives his legitimacy, after all, primarily from the fact
that he is the son of the "Great Leader," and he will surely be
reluctant to initiate changes in the political and economic sys-
tem that could in any way be interpreted as a repudiation of his
father's legacy.
North Korea is clearly caught in a political and economic
box. If it refuses to change, it runs the real risk of an upheaval
from below. Yet, if it begins the process of change, it is likely to
find itself eventually undone by a process of reform initiated
from above.
[Vol. 19:25
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If this analysis is accurate, it leads to the depressing conclu-
sion that fundamental change in North Korea, which is almost
certainly a necessary condition for the reunification of the pe-
ninsula, will probably have to await the passing or replacement
of Kim Jong II. Still, as the experience of the last several years
demonstrates, history has a tendency to unfold in strange and
unexpected ways and no one can preclude the possibility that
North Korea, sooner rather than later, will go the way of the
other failed communist dinosaurs in the Soviet Union, Eastern
Europe, and Asia. And that, as the great political theorist Wil-
liam Shakespeare once wrote in another context, "is a consum-
mation devoutly to be wished."
